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Leona A. Henry, Guido Möllering*
Collective Corporate Social Responsibility:
The Role of Trust as an Organizing Principle**
Abstract
Organizing corporate social responsibility (CSR) on a collective, rather than on the
individual firm level, results in a set of specific challenges for organizations. The
aim of this article is to assess these challenges inherent in collective CSR and to
conceptualize trust as an organizing principle within these networks. To do so, we
explore and outline the chief challenges faced within horizontal cooperation be-
tween inter-organizational actors aiming to realize CSR efforts collectively. Subse-
quently, we draw from the literature on trust as an organizing principle in inter-or-
ganizational networks and go on to develop mechanisms through which trust can
address these challenges. This article contributes a new analytical framework that
informs future studies on the role of trust in collective CSR. It enables a differenti-
ated analysis of the potential, but also the pitfalls, of trust-based CSR at the net-
work level.




There is increased awareness that, in order to meet the challenge of Corporate So-
cial Responsibility (CSR), organizations must collaborate with various partners to
be able to address the complexity and “wickedness” inherent in CSR (Bryson, Cros-
by, & Stone, 2015; Rittel & Webber, 1973; Selsky & Parker, 2005). Consequently,
we have witnessed the rapid rise of various forms of inter-organizational collabora-
tion, including multi-stakeholder initiatives, cross-sectoral partnerships and innova-
tion consortia. While the collective organization of CSR practices thus seems both
promising and inevitable, prior research has emphasized simultaneously the many
collaborative challenges in networked cooperation around CSR (henceforth referred
to as ‘collective CSR’). These include the challenges of (merely) symbolic contribu-
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tions (Delmas & Montes-Sancho, 2010), coopetition (Stadtler & Van Wassenhove,
2016), and interfirm rivalry (Hahn & Pinkse, 2014). Even though these might be
risks faced in other forms of cooperation as well, this article builds on the notion
that in collective CSR these risks are reinforced, as CSR embodies several dimen-
sions inherent in grand challenges: the most significant, complex, and interdepen-
dent problems that societies are facing (Ferraro, Etzion & Gehman, 2015). Espe-
cially the great complexity inherent in CSR and its growing salience make it essen-
tial to consider how collective CSR can be organized so that it achieves its goals and
delivers value (Andrews & Entwistle, 2010).
In this conceptual article, we assess the role of trust as a possible organizing princi-
ple for collective CSR. Organizing principles, defined as “the logic by which work is
coordinated and by which information is gathered, disseminated and processed
within and between organizations” (Zander & Kogut, 1995), include the classic
principles of market and hierarchy, but scholars have also theorized more informal
principles, such as trust (McEvily, Perrone, & Zaheer, 2003; Ouchi, 1980). In their
useful framework on trust as an organizing principle, McEvily et al. (2003) pro-
posed seven distinct properties and pathways through which trust can lead to effect-
ive organizing in inter-organizational networks by enabling processes of mobiliza-
tion and structuration. In our article, we integrate these properties into the specific
challenges identified by the literature on collective CSR and explore how trust can
work as a possible organizing principle within such networks.
To theorize this question, we focus on four major challenges mentioned by the ex-
tant literature on collective CSR, defined as horizontal cooperation between inter-
organizational actors with the aim of collectively realizing CSR efforts. While our
extensive literature review revealed several types of collaborative challenges faced by
actors in such settings, four challenges appeared as the most dominant, since they
appear across several studies and capture various underlying categories of problems.
These challenges pertain to 1) creating a collaborative governance structure, 2) rec-
onciling collective versus individual interests, 3) distinguishing symbolic from sub-
stantial contributions, and 4) coping with power imbalances. Our assessment shows
the exact way in which trust as an organizing principle, according to McEvily et al.
(2003), can address these four challenges.
Hence, this article advances knowledge in several ways: First of all, we contribute to
the stream of research on inter-organizational collaboration around grand chal-
lenges (Olsen, Sofka, & Grimpe, 2017; Seidl & Werle, 2018). By integrating litera-
ture on organizing through trust and linking it to the challenges firms face when
engaging in collective CSR, we provide innovative insights into possible organizing
mechanisms for such collective endeavors. Our understanding is therefore enhanced
in regard to the conditions under which collective strategies can become effective in
addressing grand challenges (Hahn & Pinkse, 2014; Olsen, Sofka, & Grimpe,
2016). Secondly, this article contributes to trust research by further assessing and
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refining the pathways through which trust can work as an organizing principle in
conditions of high uncertainty and complexity. This latter point is important, as
several authors have highlighted the positive effect of trust on collaborative practices
between stakeholders (Fadeeva, 2005; Tate, Ellram, & Gölgeci, 2013; Wondolleck
& Yaffee, 2003), but only few have specifically addressed the mechanisms or pro-
cesses that could potentially enable this effect.
In the following we will start by outlining the chief challenges we identified in prior
literature on collective CSR. Subsequently, we reflect on the role of trust as an orga-
nizing principle for those networks, drawing specifically from the properties and
pathways of organizing through trust based on the model by McEvily et al. (2003).
We conclude with an analytical framework of our own, which connects these path-
ways and the specific challenges we identified for the organization of collective
CSR.
Theory Development
Challenges in Collective CSR
We adopt the definition of CSR as an umbrella term referring to the responsibilities
of business firms towards their stakeholders and the natural environment and how
these responsibilities are operationalized (Rasche, 2012). In this article, we focus on
the inter-organizational relationships established to meet those responsibilities, i.e.
collective CSR. This term includes, for example, multi-stakeholder initiatives
(Bäckstrand, 2006), cross-sectoral partnerships (Selsky & Parker, 2005) or organiza-
tional search consortia (Olsen et al., 2016, 2017). CSR, and as such also collective
CSR, is considered a highly complex matter, first of all because it represents a set of
overarching problems including climate change and labour exploitation (Ferraro et
al., 2015). These issues, referred to as grand challenges, are considered to be the
most significant and complex problems today's societies are facing. Other authors
refer to them as ‘meta-problems’: multi-dimensional problems of strategic signifi-
cance that often cut across different industries or sectors (Seidl & Werle, 2018).
Secondly, CSR's complexity lies in the fact that the inherent triad of economic, en-
vironmental and social dimensions contains various paradoxical elements and ten-
sions (Hahn, Pinkse, Preuss, & Figge, 2015).
While collective CSR is seen increasingly as a necessary and desirable form to effec-
tively address the various stakeholder expectations that CSR entails, prior research
has also emphasized the many collaborative challenges actors face in these networks
(see Bryson et al., 2015). For the purposes of this article, we proceeded by collecting
and analyzing all the challenges we found in prior literature on collective CSR.
During this process, four overarching categories crystallized, which we believe cover
the most salient types of challenge in this context. These categories are not univer-
sal, nor completely separable or entirely unique to CSR networks. However, their
repetition across many studies on collective CSR supports the assumption that they
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cover the most common and important challenges of organizing such collabora-
tions. Below, we will outline them in greater detail.
Creating a collaborative governance structure
The first major challenge in collective CSR is that of creating an effective collabora-
tive governance structure for the cooperation (Bryson, Crosby, & Stone, 2006;
Detomasi, 2007; Thomson & Perry, 2006). Governance can be defined as “the use
of institutions and structures of authority and collaboration to allocate resources,
and to coordinate and control joint action across the network as a whole” (Provan
& Kenis, 2008, p. 231). Relevant questions for the creation of collaborative gover-
nance structures include who is eligible to make decisions, which actions are al-
lowed or restrained, what information will be provided, and how benefits will be
divided (Thomson & Perry, 2006). While the suitable design of network gover-
nance is a general challenge for inter-organizational networks (Provan & Kenis,
2008), in collective CSR this challenge is reinforced by the fact that actors engage
in shared responsibility for an issue with largely unknown characteristics, outcomes
and interdependencies between actors (Alvarez, Pilbeam, & Wilding, 2010; Olsen,
Sofka, & Grimpe, 2016). These uncertainties naturally challenge the design of gov-
ernance structures, as they make it almost impossible to provide clear answers to the
aforementioned set of governance questions.
Reconciling collective and individual interests
The second major challenge identified by the literature on collective CSR is that of
reconciling collective and individual interests (Hahn & Pinkse, 2014; Huxham &
Vangen, 1996; Thomson & Perry, 2006). Stadtler and Van Wassenhove (2016) re-
fer to this challenge as the paradox of coopetition: On the one hand, the actors in-
volved strive to realize collectively something that none of them can achieve unilat-
erally and that is also more important than their own profit maximization. Yet, at
the same time they seek to improve the company’s market position vis-à-vis other
players. Huxham and Vangen (1996) emphasize how the voluntary character of
these collaborations means that actors often have to justify the pursuit of any indi-
vidual aims, even if those are legitimate. The authors argue that this situation can
subsequently lead to refraining from collaboration altogether.
The challenge of reconciling collective and individual interests has been shown to
arise between actors from different sectors, as they each come into the collaboration
with their own identities and backgrounds (Di Domenico, Tracey, & Haugh, 2009;
Selsky & Parker, 2005). However, as Hahn and Pinkse (2014) show, this tension
can also become salient for same-sector actors, who compete with each other over
both legitimacy and capabilities. This creates a situation in which actors strive for
partnership effectiveness on the one hand, yet are trying at the same time to out-
Challenge 1:
Challenge 2:
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compete similar actors, which can considerably limit the effectiveness of cross-sec-
toral partnerships (Hahn & Pinkse, 2014).
Distinguishing substantial from symbolic contributions
The third chief challenge for collective CSR pertains to the difficulty in distinguish-
ing symbolic from substantial contributions (Delmas & Montes-Sancho, 2010;
Wondolleck & Yaffee, 2003). Although the danger of symbolic contributions, or
free-riding behavior, is essentially present in any type of multi-actor network coop-
eration, the risk in collective CSR is reinforced for two reasons. First of all, in col-
lective CSR, individual contributions are very hard to identify, especially as they
also tend to fluctuate over time (Delmas & Montes-Sancho, 2010). Moreover, sym-
bolic contributions in collective CSR are often tolerated to keep the collaborative
initiative alive or to gain momentum, because the participation of many stakehold-
ers, regardless of their actual contribution, seems more desirable than no participa-
tion at all (Lenox, 2006). Nevertheless, it is evident that these merely symbolic con-
tributions do not enhance the overall collaboration process and examples from the
literature show the salience of the ‘sincerity dilemma’ in collective CSR.
Coping with power differences
The final challenge we outline is that of coping with power imbalances between ac-
tors in collective CSR, which is a challenge mentioned particularly often in research
on multi-stakeholder initiatives and accountability standards (see Bäckstrand,
2006). Power imbalances are a reinforced challenge in collective CSR, as these col-
laborations often include smaller stakeholders from developing countries who lack
the bargaining power to compete with large multinationals in these networks (Ab-
bott & Snidal, 2009). Several studies show how smaller stakeholders are not in-
volved in the collaboration as much as one would hope for: For example, in their
analysis of multi-stakeholder initiatives, Fransen and Kolk (2007) reveal how gover-
nance within multi-stakeholder initiatives is largely designed around developed-
country partners while the most vulnerable groups are often excluded from deci-
sion-making processes.
In a similar vein, studies have shown how NGOs tend to be co-opted by large
multinationals, mostly resulting from a deliberate strategy by those financially
much stronger, for-profit organizations (Baur & Schmitz, 2012). Co-optation, un-
derstood as the loss of NGO autonomy when engaging with corporate partners, is a
great challenge for collective CSR; first of all, as the transformation from watchdog
to partner usually results in a loss of identity and distracts these NGOs from pursu-
ing their initial mission (Rodríguez-Garavito, 2005). Moreover, it limits their will-
ingness to use those (disruptive) strategies that are necessary for goal attainment
(Baur & Schmitz, 2012).
Challenge 3:
Challenge 4:
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In conclusion, we have identified four overarching challenges in extant literature
that cover the range of collective CSR challenges. While each of those might also be
a challenge in general settings of inter-organizational collaboration, we particularly
emphasize the factors that reinforce these challenges in collective CSR.
Trust as an Organizing Principle
Before taking a look at the role that trust may play in relation to these challenges,
we clarify the term “organizing principle”, which is defined as the logic by which
work is coordinated and by which information is gathered, disseminated and pro-
cessed within and between organizations (Zander & Kogut, 1995). Organizing
principles operate on the basis of distinct mechanisms that orient, enable or con-
strain economic behavior (McEvily et al., 2003). The logic of distinguishing be-
tween different manners of organizing economic transactions can be traced back to
Williamson’s (1981) transaction cost framework, which outlines how behavioral un-
certainties, in combination with specific contracting concerns, determine the choice
of an effective control mechanism for economic transactions. In Williamson’s initial
framework, these control mechanisms pertained to either market or hierarchy. This
framework was later extended by scholars who recognized a third control mecha-
nism of a more informal nature, including clans or trust (Ouchi, 1980). Moreover,
subsequent research has emphasized how these control mechanisms, which were
mostly perceived as mutually exclusive until then, in fact often work in combina-
tion (Bradach & Eccles, 1989; Möllering, 2002).
For the purposes of this article, and for reasons of consistency, we adopt the widely
accepted general definition of trust used by McEvily et al. (2003, p. 92; based on
Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995; Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer, 1998), i.e.
“the willingness to accept vulnerability based on positive expectations about anoth-
er’s intentions or behaviors.” While this is a psychological definition at heart, it can
be applied to the inter-organizational context of collective CSR, in as much as it
pertains to the generalized expectations of those organizational representatives in-
volved in joint initiatives.
There are several reasons why trust could be an effective organizing principle in the
context of collective CSR: First of all, hierarchical control has generally been seen as
a means to address appropriation concerns (Gulati & Singh, 1998). However, the
mostly voluntary character of collective CSR and its uncertain outcomes make ap-
propriation concerns and thus hierarchical organizing principles largely obsolete.
Relying solely on market mechanisms, however, is not realistic for organizing collec-
tive CSR either, as those involve substantial risks of knowledge spillover or freerid-
ing behavior (Delmas and Keller, 2005). Secondly, trust has been argued to be a
suitable alternative organizing principle in contexts where vulnerability is high (e.g.
Möllering, 2012) and when performance ambiguity prevails (Dirks, 2000). Both
these factors are inherent in CSR organizing due to the uncertain nature of the spe-
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cific practices being organized, as well as the vulnerability inherent to this type of
collective action.
In the remainder of this article, we build on the framework of trust as an organizing
principle developed by McEvily et al. (2003). In this framework, the authors com-
mence by outlining two overarching processes through which trust influences orga-
nizing, namely structuring and mobilizing. Structuring refers to the potential to
shape stable and enduring interaction patterns between organizations as a result of
trust, whereas mobilizing refers to the ability to combine and coordinate resources
efficiently towards collective endeavors through the presence of trust. Within these
two overarching processes, the authors outline seven different organizational prop-
erties that enable organizing in networks: density, stability, multiplexity, non-redun-
dancy, knowledge sharing, committing and reducing safeguarding. These properties can
be seen as interaction patterns and processes that enable and constrain the coordi-
nation of work among individuals (McEvily et al., 2003). The fact that these prop-
erties include both patterns and processes explains the mixture of noun and verb
forms (e.g. density versus committing).
Table 1. Overview of properties and causal pathways for trust-based organizing. Definitions
adapted from McEvily et al. (2003).
Organizational property Trust pathway leading to the property
Density: The overall level of net-
work closure, i.e. the number of
connected ties
Transferability: This process denotes the formation of a new
relationship between previously unconnected individuals
through a mutually trusted third party, leading to the forma-
tion of dense networks.
Multiplexity: The number of rela-
tions within a given network tie,
e.g. two people being both friends
and colleagues
Generative capacity: Similar to trust transfer between two ac-
tors, generative capacity concerns trust transfer within the
scope of a single relationship, i.e. the development of an addi-
tional relationship layer.
Stability: The durability of the re-
lationships within networks
Delayed reciprocity: Trust reduces the need for instantaneous
compensations, as actors can be certain that their commit-
ments will be honored at some point in the future.
Non-redundancy: Reduced levels
of redundancy between actors’ ac-
tivities through specialized roles
Role specialization: Trust enables the use of specialized actors
in networks, e.g. brokers, as it instills confidence that the bro-
ker will convey accurate information and not hold any infor-
mation back.
Knowledge sharing: The process of
disclosing knowledge to others
and granting others access to
one’s own knowledge
Disclosing and screening: Trust enables efficient disclosure of
knowledge, as the sender can trust the receiver to handle this
information appropriately, as well as reduce the screening
time of that knowledge.
Committing: The overall strength
of attachment in the networks’ re-
lationships
Identifying: As actors come to trust each other, they may be-
gin to identify with each other’s needs, preferences and prior-
ities.
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Organizational property Trust pathway leading to the property
Reduced safeguarding: The (lower)
inclination to guard against op-
portunistic behavior
Suspending judgement: Trust enables actors to adopt an ori-
entation toward another actor that assumes the other party’s
intentions and motives are benevolent, i.e. to give others the
benefit of the doubt.
While it is not counter-intuitive that properties such as density or stability may re-
sult from trustful interactions, the usefulness of this framework lies in the fact that
the authors also outline distinct causal pathways that explain how and why trust is
likely to lead to these properties. For example, the network property density tends to
result from the causal pathway of transferability, denoting the formation of a rela-
tionship between two unknown individuals through a mutually trusted third party
(McEvily et al., 2003). In Table 1, we provide an overview of each of the seven net-
work properties and a short explanation of their corresponding causal pathways.
We submit that this framework provides a fruitful starting point for the objectives
of this article for two reasons: Firstly, the authors built this framework in order to
broaden our understanding of how trust can be used to organize uncertain econo-
mic activities, which fits the challenges of collective CSR as we have shown above.
Moreover, the framework's reliance on network analytical concepts makes it partic-
ularly suitable for this article’s focus on collective forms of CSR. For our analysis,
we do not aim to reproduce the framework fully in the context of collective CSR.
We see both the proposed properties and their pathways as fruitful foundations for
understanding and theorizing the role of trust in collective CSR contexts, but we do
not ‘test’ whether all of them are equally applicable. In the next section, we elabo-
rate on the role of these properties and pathways in the context of collective CSR
challenges.
Trust and Collective CSR Challenges
In this section, we outline how the aforementioned seven properties and pathways
of organizing defined by McEvily et al. (2003) are fostered through trust, and indi-
cate their potential in addressing the main challenges we identified for collective
CSR.
Creating a collaborative governance structure
The first challenge we highlighted is the creation of an effective collaborative gover-
nance structure, referring to the institutions and structures actors create to allocate
resources and to coordinate and control joint action across the network (Provan &
Kenis, 2008).
Non-redundancy through role specialization – The first relevant property we propose
for this challenge is that of non-redundancy, referring to reduced redundancies in
organizational networks resulting from the presence and use of specialized roles. Ac-
Challenge 1:
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cording to McEvily et al. (2003), trust enables the use of these specialized roles, as it
allows the other partners to place confidence in brokers to convey accurate and
timely information to the other actors, rather than engaging in selective filtering.
Moreover, trust allows for the expectation that these brokers will provide access to
valuable contacts and referrals when possible, rather than keeping this information
to themselves. In sum, trust enables a broker to fulfill an important coordination
function, without the actors having to wonder whether this broker might be an un-
trustworthy tertius gaudens (Simmel, 1950). In the context of collective CSR, sever-
al authors have emphasized the importance of such specialized roles for realizing co-
ordination and joint action in collective CSR, including boundary spanners
(Williams, 2002) or relationship managers (Sagawa, Segal, & Kanter, 2000), who
have the important task of building and managing the interpersonal relationships
necessary for efficient coordination.
Stability through delayed reciprocity – A second relevant property for the challenge of
collaborative governance, we propose, is that of network stability. As McEvily et al.
(2003) argue, trust fosters stability through delayed reciprocity, referring to a situa-
tion in which each party is confident that any commitments made will be honored
at some point in the future, without expecting immediate compensations. Delayed
reciprocity plays an important role in coordination processes, as it allows for greater
flexibility in situations of uncertainty and increases an organization's capacity to
handle such uncertainty while maintaining its basic structure (McEvily et al.,
2003). As the high levels of task and outcome ambiguity in collective CSR make its
coordination process highly uncertain and fluid, we expect some level of stability
from trust to be beneficial in coping with this.
Moreover, several studies in collective CSR emphasize the need for the actors in-
volved to develop a shared language, allowing for the development of routines and
joint capacity building (Hardy, Lawrence, & Phillips, 2006). For example, in their
study on sustainable innovations, Olsen et al. (2017) show how effective search
strategies for sustainable innovation were developed by those innovation consortia
that already had previous collaborative experience and had indeed developed a set of
joint routines and structures. As these experiences are only possible in environments
that allow repeated interactions, we propose that stability is important for the chal-
lenge of collaborative governance, too.
Reconciling collective and individual interests
The second challenge in collective CSR we identified is that of reconciling collec-
tive and individual interests, resulting from the fact that in these contexts actors
strive for partnership effectiveness while at the same time seeking to improve their
own outcomes.
Knowledge sharing through disclosing and screening – We propose that the first prop-
erty through which trust can play an important role in reconciling the tensions be-
Challenge 2:
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tween collective and individual interests is that of effective knowledge sharing. As
McEvily et al. (2003) argue, trust shapes an environment conducive to knowledge
sharing through the pathways of disclosing and screening. Disclosing refers to the fact
that once trust is in place, it allows the sender to disclose sensitive information
without fear of judgment or knowledge spillover. Screening, then, refers to a reduc-
tion in time spent screening that information once the sender trusts its source, lead-
ing to enhanced effectiveness of knowledge sharing. We propose that this pathway
is relevant in the context of this tension for two reasons.
First of all, effective knowledge sharing has been argued to be salient for coopera-
tion in collective CSR, as it makes actors strongly aware of their interdependencies
(Wondolleck & Yaffee, 2003). This realization of interdependencies can, on the one
hand, lead to the recognition of complementary capabilities, which is important to
ensure the effectiveness of collective capacity-building (Hahn & Pinkse, 2014). On
the other hand, it might increase actors’ awareness of what is at stake if the collabo-
ration did not take place, which has also been shown to be an effective trigger for
collaboration (Logsdon, 1991).
In a similar vein, in their work on cross-sectoral partnerships, Hahn and Pinkse
(2014) argue how one important condition that influences whether the tension of
collective versus individual interests becomes problematic for collaborative out-
comes is that of “problem specificity”, referring to the explicitness with which the
problems and solutions are defined among the actors. As this achievement of prob-
lem specificity first requires the actors to share detailed and profound information
(Hahn & Pinkse, 2014), knowledge sharing is an important enabler to address the
tension between collective versus individual interests. These processes will not im-
mediately eliminate the tension of collective versus individual interests, nor will
they make interfirm rivalry completely redundant. However, by creating an envi-
ronment highly conducive to knowledge sharing, trust is likely to serve as an impor-
tant stepping-stone towards alleviating this challenge.
Multiplexity through generative capacity – The second relevant property we see in ad-
dressing the challenge of collective versus individual interests is that of multiplexity,
referring to the degree to which a pair of actors is linked through multiple roles or
relationship layers (Tichy, Tushman, & Fombrun, 1979). McEvily et al. (2003) em-
phasize how trust fosters the development of multiplex ties through the process of
generative capacity, denoting trust as being transferred through the same tie. As the
authors argue, a relationship between two partners that started out on a purely for-
mal basis might also develop over time into a friendship as a result of trust develop-
ment between those actors. Multiplexity is an important factor for the challenge of
reconciling collective and individual interests, as it is likely to result in actors' con-
nectedness beyond the initial boundaries of the partnership. This is likely to be an
important factor in reducing the potential negative impacts that tensions between
individual versus collective interests may cause (Hahn & Pinkse, 2014).
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Distinguishing substantial from symbolic contributions
This third challenge refers to the difficulty of distinguishing substantial from sym-
bolic contributions in collective CSR, due to the fact that individual contributions
are hard to identify and may change over time (Delmas & Montes-Sancho, 2010),
and that symbolic behavior is often tolerated to keep the collective institution alive
(Lenox, 2006).
Density through transferability – As a first relevant property for this challenge, we
propose density, a structural network property denoting the proportion of connect-
ed ties or level of network closure (Tichy et al., 1979). According to McEvily et al.
(2003), trust fosters dense networks through the process of trust transfer, meaning
that two people who have little or no knowledge of each other can develop trust in
each other relatively quickly when they share trust in a third party. Through this
process, trust allows for the development of ties between unknown actors and fos-
ters the formation of dense networks. We propose that density is an important
pathway towards addressing the tension of symbolic versus substantial contributions
for the following reasons. First and foremost, network literature has emphasized re-
peatedly how dense networks offer high levels of social control and monitoring
(Coleman, 1988; Uzzi, 1997), increasing the chance that network actors are in-
formed about each other’s (mis)behavior. In a study assessing the determinants of
freeriding behavior in collective CSR, Delmas and Montes-Sancho (2010) demon-
strated empirically how the freeriding actors were those exposed to lower political,
peer, and social pressures than actors that showed substantive contributions. More-
over, this study demonstrated how firms with strong links to trade associations were
less likely to engage in freeriding behavior. Density can provide a network structure
in which these social pressures are more likely to be exerted and adhered to, and in
which links to external parties are formed more easily.
Secondly, density can be helpful in adressing symbolic contributions in the phase of
partner selection, as one of the problems in collective CSR lies in the fact that great
heterogeneity between actors makes it difficult to assess the suitability and trustwor-
thiness of potential new partners (Rondinelli & London, 2003). As these dense net-
works tend to result in an important archive of information on the availability,
competencies and reliabilities of prospective new partners (Gulati & Gargiulo,
1999), density can play a salient role for this particular aspect in the process of pre-
venting merely symbolic contributions.
Coping with power imbalances
The last major challenge for collective CSR organizing is that of power differences
between actors in collective CSR, which have taken the shape of marginalization or
exclusion of vulnerable stakeholders from decision-making and governance process-
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Reduction of safeguarding through suspending judgement – The first network property
we consider relevant for this challenge is the reduction of safeguarding, resulting
from suspended judgment: i.e. adopting an orientation toward another actor that
assumes the other party’s intentions and motives are benevolent (McEvily et al.,
2003). The reduction of safeguarding should be very useful to address this chal-
lenge, as it is likely to (positively) influence actors’ attitudes prior to collaboration,
which have been argued to be highly influential for the manner in which actors in
collective CSR enter bargaining processes prior to or during collaboration (Abbott
& Snidal, 2009). These authors emphasize how NGOs tend to portray firms as
wanting to engage in normatively inappropriate practices to increase their profit,
while from the firm perspective, NGOs are seen as actors who do not understand
the needs of business in competitive markets and have unrealistic conceptions of
what standards and procedures are compatible with production. In a similar vein,
Holzer (2008) argues how, in the context of NGO-corporate collaboration, corpo-
rate managers distinguish between ‘cooperation-oriented’ and ‘event-oriented’
NGOs, denoting a distinction between those the company can deal with and those
whose demands are considered too radical. These assumptions are likely to reinforce
the use of power, as both parties’ actions are based on a set of a-priori assumptions
about the other parties’ capabilities and intentions. Abbott and Snidal (2009), for
example, show how these perceptions are highly influential on the extent to which
actors try to push their own interests prior to collaboration, as they already have a
fixed image of how the other party will behave. Suspension of safeguarding can alle-
viate these perceptions or predispositions, and as such positively influence the chal-
lenge of coping with power differences.
Committing through identifying – The next property we propose as relevant in re-
ducing the challenge of power differences is commitment. McEvily et al. (2003) ar-
gue how establishing commitment between actors is fostered by the process of iden-
tification: once actors start to trust each other, they will identify increasingly with
one another, and begin to perceive each other’s needs, preferences and priorities as
their own. Depicted in this manner, identification is mostly a result of collaborat-
ing, yet as Baur and Schmitz (2012) argue, identification is also highly relevant in
the process of selecting potential collaborators. These authors show how co-opta-
tion of NGOs is a likely result if corporations end up collaborating with NGOs
perceived as not being too radical. While they are also chosen simply to control the
fallout of civil society mobilization against their unethical behavior (Baur &
Schmitz, 2012), these NGOs might not always be partners to select if corporations
want to actually contribute to the issue at hand. Commitment through identifica-
tion is thus important in this context, as it increases the salience of collective goals
and values (McEvily et al., 2003), which is in turn likely to lead to increased issue
identification. At the same time, this identification with and understanding of the
issue will enable corporations to identify more easily the partners that could be rele-
vant collaborators with which to address it.
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In sum, we see that trust can play an important role for dealing with challenges in-
herent in collective CSR, yet its potential to work as an organizing principle in
these settings seems higher for some challenges than others. In Table 2, we summa-
rize the challenges we identified along with their relevant properties and pathways.
Table 2. Collective CSR challenges and relevant network properties
Collective CSR challenge  Network property
Challenge 1:   
Creating a collaborative gover-
nance structure →
Stability: allows for the development of shared rou-
tines.
Non-redundancy: allows for effective use of special-
ized roles in networks, such as brokers.
Challenge 2:   
Reconciling collective and individu-
al interests →
Knowledge sharing: makes actors realize their inter-
dependencies.
Multiplexity: fosters connectedness beyond the
scope of the initial partnership.
Challenge 3:   
Distinguishing substantial from
symbolic contributions →
Density: offers high levels of social control and moni-
toring benefits.
Challenge 4:   
Coping with power imbalances
→
Committing: stimulates substantial investment
through increased identification.
Reduction of safeguarding: fosters increased com-
mitment to the issue at stake and enables identifica-
tion of relevant stakeholders.
Discussion
There is increased awareness of the notion that CSR and its inherent complexity
can only be addressed if organizational actors engage in collective efforts to pool
their resources and skills (Bryson et al., 2015; Olsen et al. 2016, 2017). However,
this very process comes along with a number of collaboration challenges that call
for a suitable organizing principle for such collective endeavors. Our conceptual ar-
ticle provides an overview of these challenges and assesses the role of trust as a possi-
ble organizing principle to address them. Based on the framework of trust as an or-
ganizing principle by McEvily et al. (2003), we have elaborated through which net-
working processes the collective CSR challenges we identified can be overcome on
the basis of inter-organizational trust.
Our assessment shows firstly that while all pathways are relevant for collective CSR,
some pathways of organizing may be more applicable than others. Density, for ex-
ample, turned out to be a very promising organizing pathway, as the monitoring
and control benefits it offers are essentially useful for all of the challenges involved.
The same applies to the pathway of knowledge sharing, as an environment con-
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ducive to knowledge sharing essentially alleviates all of the challenges and that of
reconciling collective versus individual interests in particular. Other pathways, such
as suspending judgment, are also relevant, but they address very specific aspects of
collective CSR and perhaps to a lesser degree. Moreover, challenges of a very practi-
cal nature, such as resource dependencies, are less likely to be organized through
trust only. It thus seems that trust can be an effective organizing principle for some
but not all collective CSR challenges, and that some of the pathways defined by
McEvily et al. (2003) are particularly relevant in this context.
What has also become clear during our analysis is that the main challenge for col-
lective CSR lies in the fact that it is almost impossible to evaluate these relationships
and their perceived usefulness in reality. In their contribution on network dynam-
ics, Ring and Van de Ven (1994) argue that when actors form cooperative relation-
ships, they constantly assess these based on the factors of efficiency and equity. Effi-
ciency refers to selecting the most efficient manner of organizing a collective prac-
tice, whereas equity refers to “fair dealings”, e.g. the perception that all actors in-
volved receive adequate benefits in the light of their investments. Both these factors
play a salient role in the actors’ evaluation of the relationship and the decision to
continue it or not. While perceptions of efficiency and equity are often (partly)
measurable or foreseeable in network cooperation, in collective CSR these are diffi-
cult to assess not only prior to but also during the cooperation.
While our assessment shows that the literature on inter-organizational networks and
CSR already touches upon several important aspects, some emerging themes for a
full exploration of collective CSR challenges are still left unaddressed or should be
addressed in greater detail. Below, we will outline three salient future research direc-
tions for the challenges in collective CSR:
The emergence of trust: In order to establish whether or not to engage in CSR coop-
eration, network literature has shown how trust can work as a trigger for coopera-
tion and has also devoted attention to the mechanisms that enable this effect (Gu-
lati & Singh, 1998; Uzzi, 1997; Zaheer, McEvily, & Perrone, 1998). However, most
research on CSR in networks so far has conceptualized trust as a static property, dis-
regarding the dynamics of trust as a process (e.g. Möllering, 2013; Korsgaard,
Kautz, Bliese, Samson, & Kostyszyn, 2018). The fact that freeriding and power dif-
ferences are such salient issues in collective CSR makes it all the more important to
understand this process of trust development.
The dark sides of collective CSR and trust: Two aspects left largely unaddressed in this
article are the potential dark sides of both collective CSR and trust. Even though
collective action is generally seen as a promising pathway towards facing the com-
plexity inherent in CSR issues, there is also reason for caution. Joint CSR activities
have been shown to be not representative or inclusive in many instances (Fransen &
Kolk, 2007) and to serve mainly to protect large multinationals rather than to actu-
ally solve any labor or environmental problems (O’Rourke, 2006). Critical voices
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argue that such collaborations might even lead to a privatization of global gover-
nance, to weakening and fragmenting of the multilateral order and reinforcing a
neoliberal world (Bäckstrand, 2006).
Unfortunately, certain trust dynamics that have been pointed out by researchers
might play a role in keeping such spurious institutions alive. For actors who seek
collective CSR collaborations, it is unlikely they will approach such networks with
high levels of distrust as an initial predisposition. In such instances, their trust may
be misplaced and conceal the actual trustworthiness of the partners in the collabora-
tion (Skinner, Dietz & Weibel, 2014), which can be reinforced in collective CSR
settings by the fact that freeriding is hard to detect and often remains unsanctioned
(Delmas and Montes-Sancho, 2010), not to mention the general risk of deception
in trust relationships (Möllering, 2009).
Moreover, trust might prevent actors from leaving spurious collective CSR settings,
if these concern long-standing social exchanges and deep bonds of indebtedness, a
situation referred to as the “trust trap” (Skinner et al., 2014; Möllering & Sydow,
2019). In a similar vein, network research has pointed out the downsides of
“overembeddedness” (Uzzi, 1997), i.e. abundantly high levels of trust in networks
that may cause unintended lock-in effects for organizations. Finally, too much trust
has also been argued to decrease the innovative capacity of the actors involved and
reduce the urge for organizations to search for new, perhaps more suitable partners
to collaborate with (Schnittfeld & Busch, 2016). As for collective CSR, we should
thus remain critical in terms of these networks’ true aims, as well as understanding
the boundary conditions of trust as a desirable organizing principle.
Equity issues in grand challenges: In order to understand how the notion of equity
can be sustained in highly complex and uncertain endeavors such as CSR, we must
go beyond solely assessing the effect of trust, and we cannot assume that its mere
presence will solve the problem of distributive justice. As shown by Gausdal, Svare,
and Möllering (2016) the mere presence of trust within networks does not suffice
to ensure network benefits for all involved, as this is also highly contingent upon
factors such as the level of actual actor cooperation. As potential benefits are often
not foreseeable in the context of grand challenges, we should assess more carefully
what makes actors contribute in these settings regardless of this fact, and how trust
can foster such environments.
Naturally, this study also has its limitations. To start with, there is still much variety
in the networks that pursue collective CSR and the effect of trust might work out
differently in different types of networks. Another limitation that future research
should address is that the framework we built upon, and as such our work as well,
argues from the initial notion that trust is already present in networks. This is obvi-
ously not a given, especially for networks with actors who are cooperating for the
first time. As emphasized earlier in the discussion, future studies should investigate
the dynamic development of trust among heterogeneous actors who – unlike in the
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swift-trust scenario described by Meyerson, Weick and Kramer (1996) – cannot re-
fer to established role expectations.
All in all, the framework developed in this article contributes to knowledge by pro-
viding a refined overview of CSR networks and their cooperation challenges, as well
as linking to relevant processes of organizing through trust. For future work on
these challenges, the specific pathways identified in our framework can be used to
assess whether and how the predicted effects occur in practice. Meanwhile, the
framework serves as a conceptual tool for explaining how trust-based organizing en-
ables collective CSR rather than merely asserting that collective CSR requires trust.
While we paint a positive picture of trust and CSR, the many challenges and vari-
ous pathways we highlight also serve to alert us to the fact that trust is not an easy
and certainly not a guaranteed solution. Nevertheless, it will be an important asset
for networks pursuing CSR seriously.
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